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Card Games and Economic Behaviour 




We wonder whether different game experiences are associated to significant differences in 
experimental behaviour and, more specifically, whether expert bridge players, due to their superior 
team play habits, are more likely to adopt cooperative behavior than expert poker players. Evidence 
from trust games shows that bridge players make more polarized choices and choose significantly 
more the maximum trustor contribution. Our findings are similar across incentivized and non 
incentivized experiments thereby supporting the hypothesis that behaviour in simulated experiments 
resembles that in experiments with monetary payoffs.  





                                                          




A well established tradition in the literature challenges the old tenet of time invariant preferences 
(Becker and Stigler, 1977) and discusses the nexus between frequently practiced (leisure, games, 
job) activities and individual preferences.1 The idea that activities may shape individual preferences 
is the core of the seminal Henrich et al. (2010) experiment on primitive ethnic groups. The research 
reports that Lamalera whale hunters in Indonesia display an extremely high average contribution 
(58 percent) as proposers in ultimatum games,2 the highest among the 15 primitive populations 
participating to the research. At the other extreme, the average contribution of Machiguenga, who 
engage only in family activities without cooperation with other village members, is 27 percent.  The 
interpretation of the Lalamera findings is that their everyday activity (hunting whales in large 
groups with canoes) cannot be performed in isolation and requires a high degree of cooperation and 
coordination, which progressively creates, and is in turn naturally strengthened by, social norms on 
equitable sharing rules among workmates.  
Consistently with the hypothesis of the existence of a nexus between activities and preferences 
Akerlof and Shiller (2010) have recently argued  that the traders’ bad financial practices leading to 
the global crisis, may be a reflection of changes in leisure activities, notably the decline in 
popularity of more cooperative games like bridge together with the increased diffusion of 
individualistic games like poker.3 4  The authors observe that, in 1941, 44 percent of Americans 




1 See among others Loewenstein and Angner (2003) and Malmendier and Nagel (2011).  
2 As is well known, if the offer of the proposer in the ultimatum game is not accepted by the receiver (i.e. 
because not considered fair) the payoff is nil for both.   
3 What the authors imply is that the financial crisis, and the related scandals which occurred in the same 
period in leading financial institutions, were caused by a deterioration of social skills and an increase in self-
regarding attitudes of financial traders (see Akerlof and Shiller, 2010, p. 40).  
3 
 
played bridge, a game which was “recommended as a means of learning social skills”. By contrast, 
bridge is nowadays considered a game for the elderly5 and is in strong decline while poker is 
becoming increasingly popular. 6 Their implicit argument is that a professional or an often practiced 
activity may shape individual preferences, exactly as in Henrich et al. (2010): while poker players 
are individualistic, bridge players, analogously to whale hunters, act in teams and develop their 
cooperation skills consistently with the characteristics of their preferred game practice. To provide 
support in favour of their argument Akerlof and Shiller (2010 p.40) remark that poker is always 
played for money, differently from what usually occurs in bridge, and has the characteristics that 
“deception” (variously called bluffing and keeping a “poker face”) is one of the most important 
tactics followed to maximize the players’ payoff7.  
Card games, and in particular bridge and poker, have always been an issue of great curiosity, 
inspiration and interest for academics. Borel’s (1938) and Von Neumann’s analysis of bluffing in 
poker (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), for example, contributed to the foundations of the 
information and game theory. Borel’s model of poker (called “la relance”) finds the optimal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4 Such reduced propensity to play team games is consistent with the well-known parallel evidence provided 
by Putnam (2000) showing a decrease in the number of people who bowl in leagues in spite of the increase 
of bowling players in the last 20 years. 
5 The average age of English Bridge Union members was 55 in 2006 (The Independent (2006)), while it was 
67 for members of the American Contract Bridge League in 2005 (Moore (2005)). 
6 It is hard to find updated and reliable data about the relative diffusion of the two games. About bridge the 
WBF (World Bridge Federation) states that “…The WBF has shown strong and steady growth and its 
membership now comprises 124 National Bridge Organizations (NBOs) with approximately 1,000,000 
affiliated members who participate actively in competitive bridge events (locally, nationally and 
internationally)…” (see WBF website). Reliable data on poker diffusion are even harder to find given its 
tight regulation in some countries. We refer, therefore, to the statistics of one of the major online cardrooms, 
PokerStars, having over 50 million active players at the beginning of 2012 (see PokerScout online traffic 
report (2012)). 
7 The reasoning of the authors ends with the following question: “Of course there may be no link between 
what is taking place at the card table and what is taking place in the economy. But if card games played by 
millions of people shift the role of deception, wouldn’t be so naïf simply to assume that such shifts do not 
occur also in the word of commerce?” (p. 40). 
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player’s strategies (including bluff), differentiating the cases of plain game and pot-limit poker8. 
Bridge has elicited similar interest among academics and has greatly contributed to the development 
of the probability theory9 even though, due to its complexity, it still poses a great challenge for 
game theorists10. 
Two of the most influent billionaires in the world, Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, have been 
advocating bridge qualities for years, arguing about the importance of teaching bridge starting from 
the lower school grades. They have recently financed million dollar programs to introduce bridge at 
school, convinced that “anyone’s good in bridge is gonna be great in a lot of things”11 and that in 
bridge “You have to look at all the facts. You have to draw inferences from what you've seen, what 
you've heard. You have to discard improper theories about what the hand had as more evidence 
comes in sometimes. You have to be open to a possible change of course if you get new information. 
You have to work with a partner, particularly on defense”.12 While poker actually shares with 
bridge most of the rationality enhancing characteristics described in this statement a qualifying 
difference among the two games is that bridge players are accustomed to work with a partner while 
poker players do not. This is one of the reasons inducing us to test whether bridge players behave 
differently from poker players in trust game experiments which typically test participants’ 
cooperative attitudes. 
                                                          
8 Von Neumann finds new implications just limiting losses for players. A further extension of the Borel’s 
model is given by the work of Bellman and Blackwell (1949), Bellman (1952) and Karlin and Restrepo 
(1957). 
9 Borel and Cheron (1940) explain how bridge has greatly helped in understanding the practical implications 
of probabilistic laws and theorems trough the analysis of hand distributions and the design of playing 
strategies. A new statistical method for evaluating bridge hands has been proposed by Cowan (1987). 
10 There is no comparable literature on game theory models of bridge. To our knowledge there are only 
Binmore’s suggestions of classifying bridge either as a game of imperfect information and perfect recall or 
as a two players, zero-sum game, in which case it would be a game of imperfect recall (Binmore 1992, 
2007). 
11 Bill Gates in ACBL news archive (2009) 
12 Warren Buffett interviewed by A. Crippen on the CNBC website (2008). 
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The investigation of bridge and poker player preferences is an issue so far unexplored in the 
literature falling into the broader and more investigated branch researching how field experts 
behave in lab experiments.  Along this line Becker et al. (2005) study how game theory experts play 
in the traveler’s dilemma, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) document that chess professional 
players are closer than students to the subgame perfect equilibrium in the centipedes game, while 
Palacios-Huerta (2003) and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) investigate how professionals play 
zero sum two person strategic games. As a general result this literature confirms that professional 
activities do affect experimental behavior consistently with what we find in our research.  
In order to test whether this happens also in our case we formulate the hypothesis that bridge 
players are more likely to adopt team reasoning vis-à-vis standard purely self-regarding behaviour, 
thereby sending a significantly higher amount of the endowment received in trust games and 
producing Pareto superior outcomes given the game structure.13 This should occur even though the 
analogy between the bridge and the trust game partnership is not perfect. Both trustors and bridge 
partners may increase their payoffs if they cooperate with their partners (the trustee in the case of 
the trust game, the teammate in the case of the bridge game). However the bridge teammate, 
differently from the trustee, cannot derive any benefit from an opportunistic behavior against her 
teammate. For this reason our focus is on trustors. In spite of these dissimilarities it is of high 
interest to test whether role differences of bridge and poker players may affect their decisions in 
well-known game theoretic benchmarks such as incentivized and non incentivized trust games. 
More specifically, one half of the participants to bridge matches are partners, while all participants 
                                                          
13 As is well known, the optimal strategy of a homo economicus (that is, of an individual with standard 
purely self-regarding preferences)  trustee in a trust game is to give back nothing, while that of a trustee 
following team reasoning is to give back half of the money received. As a consequence, in presence of 
common knowledge on homo economicus players’ characteristics (both players are fully self-interested, 
consistently follow the strategy of maximizing their own payoff and believe that their counterpart will also 
do so), the optimal strategy for the Nash maximizing trustor would be to give nil, while, in presence of 




to poker matches are rivals. What we conveniently assume in our paper is that rivals play as homo 
economicus (maximize their own payoff), while partners adopt a team reasoning or a we-thinking 
approach14 trying to devise strategies which maximize the team payoff. 
Our research strategy includes an online simulated experiment (OSE) without monetary payoffs 
and a monetary payoff experiment (MPE). Given this original structure of our empirical work a 
second related contribution of our research is therefore in testing whether findings from non 
incentivized experiments are good predictors of those in incentivized experiments. 
In the first non incentivized experiment we compare preferences of 1,414 bridge and 836 poker 
players when they play as trustors in simulated experiments with an original dataset built in 
cooperation with the Italian Bridge Federation and the poker online section of Snai S.p.a., the most 
important Italian betting agency15. In the second incentivized experiment we repeat our test on a 
smaller sample of expert bridge and poker players to check whether evidence from the simulated 
experiment finds correspondence with that in experiments with monetary payoffs. 
Our findings do not reject our main hypothesis providing evidence that, in both experiments, 
bridge players contribute significantly more than poker players as trustors. This is mainly accounted 
for by an 11 percent higher share of players sending all their game endowment in the OS 
experiment paralleled by an 8 percent higher share in the MP experiment, consistently with the 
optimal strategy when team rationality is common knowledge. In addition to it, in the incentivized 
experiment where we can control also for years of bridge and poker experience, we document that 
any additional year of bridge practice increases significantly the probability of team reasoning 
choice. The superior giving of bridge players does not seem to be motivated by risk aversion, pure 
altruism or inequity aversion (factors which we control for by extracting them with side 
experiments).  
                                                          
14 We use the two terms as synonyms. 
15 A questionnaire on line was proposed to bridge and poker affiliates in the summer 2012. For a detailed 
description of the modalities of the experiment see Appendix A. 
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The paper is divided into five sections (introduction and conclusions included). The second 
section outlines our theoretical hypothesis. The third section describes our simulated experiment 
and provides evidence on its descriptive findings, parametric and non parametric tests, econometric 
analysis and sensitivity analysis. The fourth section describes our incentivized experiment providing 
the same type of empirical evidence and comparing it with evidence from the simulated experiment. 
The final section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical hypothesis 
Individual utility maximizing behavior is the standard assumption on players’ preferences. An 
alternative view (Hodgson (1967), Regan (1980), Kramer, Roderick and Brewer (1984), Gilbert 
(1989), Hurley (1989), Sugden (1993, 2000 and 2003), Tuomela (1995), Hollis (1998), Bacharach 
(1997, 1999 and 2006), Gold (2008)) takes into account that individuals may use a we-mode instead 
of a I-mode attitude or, in other terms, wonder “it would be good for us if we did…” instead of the 
classic  purely self-regarding behaviour reasoning “It would be good for me if I did…” (Becchetti, 
Degli Antoni and Faillo (2010)).  
Beyond the above mentioned hypothesis of a social preference foundation of team reasoning, a 
“strategic” factor which could facilitate its adoption in social dilemmas is the “common reason to 
believe” (Sugden (2003)). The main idea is that team reasoning has a conditional nature. Group 
members are not committed to reason as a team unless there is a common (reciprocal) motive to 
believe that other members are doing the same.16  
Team thinking may be stimulated by the specific features of the game structure. The game we 
use in our simulated experiment, the trust game, has the property of “strong interdependence” 
(Bacharach (2006)), that is, of a game in which (as in Prisoners’ dilemmas and Traveller’s games) 
                                                          
16 “The internal problem is that, from the viewpoint of any individual, the validity or acceptability of team 
reasoning, narrowly defined, may be conditional on his confidence that other members of the team are 
reasoning in a similar way” (Sugden (2003), p.168). 
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there exists an outcome  preferred by both partners which can be achieved with we-thinking, which 
is Pareto superior with respect to the outcome which would be attained with standard individual 
rationality.  
Our experiment tests the hypothesis that bridge players have a higher predisposition to we-
thinking than poker players. We argue that such higher predisposition is given by their regular 
practice of a game in which success may be obtained by using we-thinking with their playing 
partners.  
Note that in both simulated and incentivized experiments we do not specify whether the 
counterpart of the trust game is another bridge/poker player in order to avoid framing effects which 
could per se lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis..  In this sense we created weaker conditions 
for our test since we do not reinforce with information on the counterpart game experience the 
“common reason to believe” argument (Sugden (2003)). 
 
 
3. The survey and the simulated experiments 
The trust investment game is a well-known sequential game which illustrates an important social 
dilemma: trusting individuals (in an economic environment which is typically characterized by 
asymmetric information and incomplete contracts as it is implicit in the game rules) may be 
rewarding since it produces super-additive outcomes, but it is also a “social risk” since the 
counterpart’s opportunism may lead the trusting player to a result which is inferior to that obtained 
with the non-cooperative strategy. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) develop this idea in their 
sequential two-player game in which a trustor, the first mover, has to decide the share of her 
endowment that she wants to transfer to an anonymous counterpart (the trustee). The amount sent 
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by the trustor is tripled17 due to the game rules. After this choice the trustee moves and may return 
to the trustor a share of what she received (including all or nothing).18 
In the Nash equilibrium of the game in which both players adopt purely self-regarding 
rationality, and purely self-regarding rationality is common knowledge (that is, each player expects 
that the counterpart will adopt purely self-regarding rationality as well), both trustor and trustee 
transfers are zero and the individual and aggregate payoffs are suboptimal. By contrast, if the two 
players adopt a we-thinking attitude, and we-thinking is common knowledge (that is, each player 
expects that the counterpart will adopt the same we-thinking attitude as well), both players do their 
best to maximize the aggregate outcome and divide it in equal parts.19 That is, the trustor will send 
all, the trustee will receive it tripled and return half of it. 
In our non incentivized trust game experiment the trustor is told to receive 100 euros and has to 
decide the amount of her endowment to give to another anonymous player (the trustee) knowing 
that the amount will be tripled and that the trustee will choose how much of the amount to return to 
the trustor. The game is only simulated and no real money is at stake.  Our design also includes, 
beyond the trust game, a dictator game and a risk aversion simulated experiments in order to 
measure separately participants’ risk attitudes and other regarding preferences. 
In the dictator game a sender is told to receive an amount of money (100 euros in our case) and 
has to decide how much to transfer to a second anonymous player (receiver). After this decision the 
                                                          
17 One of the rationales for the trust game rule of tripling the trustor contribution hinges on the assumption of 
the superadditive effects of trust and trustworthiness. With high levels of trust individuals share information 
and knowledge and cooperate, thereby generating outcomes which go beyond the sum of their stand-alone 
contributions. 
18 The success of the trust game in the behavioural literature stands in its capacity to stylize some crucial 
elements of “social dilemmas” in real life interactions: asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, 
superadditivity (see footnote 17) in case of cooperation and the fact that cooperation is profitable if 
corresponded by the counterpart but unprofitable if trust is abused. Trust game like interactions typically 
characterize relationships among individuals, organisations, companies, states and workers within productive 
organisations. For a survey on experimental findings on trust games see the meta paper of Johnson and 
Mislin (2011) and Fehr (2009). 
19 Assuming that we-thinking players are also inequality averse they will maximize and divide in equal parts 
the team outcome. 
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game ends. Since there is no reply from the receiver the sender does not send anything if she 
follows purely self-regarding behaviour. Deviations from Nash equilibrium (non-zero transfers) are 
therefore generally explained in terms of altruism or inequity aversion. Last,  our risk aversion test 
is based on the mean preserving spread principle. It asks to choose among six different lotteries 
having distributions with the same mean value but ranked in ascending order of variance.20   
The dictator game and the risk aversion simulated experiments are proposed in order to extract 
variables which can be used as controls when trying to provide a rationale to trustors’ transfer in the 
simulated trust game experiment. The experiment is proposed through an online survey. For bridge 
players it is managed by the official website of the Italian Bridge Federation, while for poker 
players by the Snai S.p.a. through a registration process. The respondents in both cases are affiliated 
regular players21. 
 
3.1 Database and descriptive evidence 
The OS experiment sample is represented by 1,414 poker and 836 bridge players who 
participated online to our mini-survey and simulated experiment.22 Properties of the two groups are 
not balanced since bridge players are 15-year older (around 56 against 41 year old poker players) 
and females for a higher share (26 against 7 percentage points) (see Table III). The observed age 
difference is consistent with evidence from the UK and the US (see footnote 5) and the  observation 
by Akerlof and Shiller (2010) that bridge is becoming a game for the elderly. 
Due to the imbalanced socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents, the robustness of 
results from standard parametric and  non parametric tests (section 3.2) will be checked with 
                                                          
20 The test is traditionally considered in the literature as the most easily understandable alternative to more 
complex experimental schemes to elicit risk and time preferences such as those of Andersen et al. (2008) and 
Holt and Laury (2002).   
21 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the modalities of the experiment. 
22 Variable legend and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in 
Tables I and II respectively. 
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econometric analysis controlling for the influence of such factors (section 3.3) and sensitivity 
analysis testing the robustness of our findings to departures from the assumption of conditional 
independence of potential outcomes and treatment assignment given observables (Conditional 
Independence Assumption, henceforth also CIA) (section 3.4). 
 
3.2 Hypothesis testing 
 
We test the following three null versus alternative hypotheses: 
i) Trust H0A: TR
Poker =TRBridge  vs. H1A: TR
Poker <TRBridge 
ii) Risk aversion H0B: RA
Poker =RABridge vs. H1B:  RA
Poker >RABridge 
iv)  Altruism H0C: Al
Poker =AlBridge vs. H1C:  Al
Poker >AlBridge 
Both parametric and non parametric tests document that the first null hypothesis is strongly 
rejected in the expected direction. Bridge players exhibit a significantly higher level of trust than 
poker players in both parametric (t-stat -4.00, p-value 0.000) and non-parametric tests (z-stat -2.63 
p-value 0.008). In terms of magnitude the difference is 7 points since bridge players send on 
average 48 against 41 experimental units, that is, 17 percent more than poker players’ on average 
(see Table IV).  
If we look at the distribution of choices we find that most of the difference depends on what 
happens at the two extreme transfer choices (Figure IA). A far higher share of bridge players 
follows team rationality by sending all (31 against 20 percent of poker players) while, somewhat 
surprisingly, a higher share of bridge players also sends zero even though the distance here is 
smaller (30 against 24 percent). This implies strong rejection of the hypothesis that the share of 
team rational players is the same among bridge and poker players (non-parametric test z-stat -34.55, 
p-value 0.000 and parametric test t-stat -5.92, p-value 0.000), but also that the share of zero 
contributors is the same among bridge than among poker players (z-stat 11.65 and  p-value 0.003 in 
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non-parametric test, t-stat -3.44 and p-value 0.002 in parametric test).23 This evidence also tells us 
that bridge players’ choices are much more polarized than poker players’ choices (61 percent 
against 44 percent). As expected, rejection of the null is even sharper in this case (z-stat 64.64 and 
p-value 0.000 in non parametric test, t-stat 8.15 and p-value 0.000 in parametric test). Beyond 
polarized choices the tendency of bridge players to give more is reinforced by what happens in 
next-to-polarized choices where bridge players chose transfers of 80 and 90 euros in a higher 
proportion than poker players and transfers in the range from 10 to 70 euros in lower proportion 
(see Figure IA). 
According to the literature on trust games (section 2), superior transfers of trustors have been 
interpreted in terms of lower risk aversion, higher pure or strategic altruism and higher inequity 
aversion. Our separate test of risk aversion shows indeed that bridge players are slightly less risk 
averse (non parametric test z-stat 4.13, p-value 0.000 and parametric test t-stat -2.90, p-value 
0.002). Furthermore, our test on “other regarding preferences” documents that they give 
significantly less in the dictator game where giving may be interpreted in terms of pure altruism or 
inequity aversion, even though in this case only the non parametric test rejects the null at high levels 
of significance (non parametric test z-stat 3.95, p-value 0.000 and parametric test t-stat 1.83, p-
value 0.067).  Here again, the result is strongly influenced by the fact that bridge players’ choices 
are much more polarized and bridge players also have a higher share of zero contributors. 
A first conclusion from these tests is that bridge player trustors give significantly more but not 
because they are more altruistic or inequity averse. The econometric analysis which follows may 
help us to check whether our findings on trustor transfers are robust to confounding factors (older 
people and women are over-represented among bridge players as compared to poker players as 
                                                          
23 We approximate trustor giving to a continuous variable and therefore test the between-subject difference 
with the Mann-Withney test. For all the other dichotomous variables in Table 4 we test differences in 
proportions with Chi square. The difference between poker and bridge players remains highly significant if 
we remove the simplifying assumption of continuity on trustor giving and test the difference of distributions.   
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shown in Table III) and whether they are more or less significant once we control for risk aversion 
and dictator giving. 
 
3.3 Econometric analysis 
 
Our benchmark specification is  
i
i
ititi XDBridgeTrustorG   10
   (1)
 
where TrustorG is a measure of trustor giving, DBridge a dummy taking value one if the survey 
respondent is a bridge player (implying that the respondent is a poker player when it is zero) and X 
are controls which include a gender dummy, age classes and (accordingly to the different 
specifications), a dummy for early responses,24 our experimental measures of risk aversion and 
dictator giving, regional and province dummies and/or proxies of education and social capital.25 
The relevant additional contribution of the regression analysis is in the possibility of controlling 
for factors affecting differences in trustors’ transfers after controlling for the impact of risk 
aversion, pure altruism and inequity aversion. In Table V the dependent variable is trustor’s giving 
and specifications are estimated using orderd logit. Standard errors are clustered at province level. 
We first include only gender and age as controls (column 1), then add experimental measures of 
risk aversion and dictator giving (column 2), (20-1) region or province dummies26 (columns 3 and 
4) and experimental measures plus region or province dummies as additional regressors (columns 5 
                                                          
24 The survey for bridge players was launched on July 2012 and remained online up to the end of September. 
The dummy gives value one to those answering before the midterm. 
25 Details on the construction of age classes, regional and province dummies are provided in Table 1. 
26 In Italy there are 20 administrative regions encompassing 110 provinces (smaller administrative areas, 
roughly coinciding with the biggest urban areas). 
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and 6). We finally replace province dummies with proxies of human and social capital at province 
level (column 7).27   
Findings illustrated in Table V document that the bridge dummy variable is always significant. 
This implies that, once we control for risk aversion and dictator giving (the latter presumably 
capturing both pure altruism and inequity aversion), the bridge effect is larger. This is consistent 
with our original hypothesis that bridge players are more trained to we-thinking and team-thinking, 
that is, they do not give more due to higher altruism, inequity aversion or lower risk aversion. With 
regard to the significance of other regressors note that our proxy of social capital at province level 
in column 7 (the number of social cooperatives) is positive and significant consistently with what 
can be assumed on theoretical grounds about the relationship between social capital and trustor 
giving. Human capital is also shown to affect our dependent variable since the provincial share of 
those with higher than intermediate education is positive and significant. 
In Table VI we take as reference our test on the relationship between bridge and team rationality. 
We therefore estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value of one 
if the trustor follows team rationality (gives all) and zero otherwise. Controls are arranged as in 
Table I in the seven different specifications. Our findings document that playing bridge raises by 
10-11 percentage points the probability of being team maximisers (consistently with what found 
descriptively) and by 14-15 percentage points the same probability when we control for risk 
aversion and dictator giving  (Table VI, columns 2, 5 and 6).  
In Table VII we replace the dummy picking up the top extreme choice with a Polarized dummy 
picking up both (top and down) extreme choices. As expected the Bridge dummy grows both in 
significance and magnitude (adding 19 percent to the probability of making polarized choices). 
                                                          
27 We use as proxy of human capital the province population share of inhabitants with higher than 
intermediate school degree and as proxy of social capital the number of cooperatives and the number of 
donations in the province.  
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To sum up, our empirical analysis highlights three strong results which are robust in both 
parametric tests, non parametric tests and regression analysis once controlled for additional 
confounding factors: bridge players i) choose in a significantly higher proportion the top extreme 
choice which is the optimal choice when both players follow team rationality (and assume that also 
the counterpart will do so); ii) are significantly more polarized on the two extreme choices 
(maximum or zero contribution). These findings support our hypothesis that the bridge game is 
associated with a significantly higher attitude to we-thinking or team rationality. They however also 
show some apparently counterintuitive evidence by documenting that poker players are in 
significantly lower proportion zero contributors. Hence, poker players do not seem to behave like 
irresponsible gamblers or act more selfishly compared to bridge players, but they just act less 
cooperatively, as in the nature of the game.  
 
3.4 Discussion of our results and sensitivity analysis 
The absence of an ex ante random selection of participants to the two bridge and poker player 
groups does not tell us whether our results depend on the impact of the game characteristics on 
players’ preferences or, instead, on a selection bias which brings individuals with higher social 
capital to become bridge rather than poker players. In such case the shift in the share of 
bridge/poker players should be considered not the cause but a signal of a change in preferences 
(reduction of we- or team reasoning) which may be caused by other factors. To clarify this point we 
propose a sensitivity analysis to see whether the observed correlation is robust when we remove the 
conditional independence assumption and simulate the effect of a confounder correlated with both 
the treatment and the outcome. 
A key assumption for the validity of our main result in identifying a causality nexus from the 
(poker or bridge) activity to individual preferences relies on the assumption of CIA. This means that 
what leads individuals to become bridge or poker players must be independent from the outcome 
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we intend to observe (trustor transfer). We are aware that this is not necessarily the case in our 
empirical analysis. There may be factors, such as family education, which may drive both the 
decision to become a bridge player and the observed outcomes of our simulated experiment. 
In order to evaluate whether and to what extent the observed difference between bridge and 
poker players is robust to deviations from the CIA assumption we perform the Ichino et al. (2008) 
sensitivity analysis28. This can be done by modelling a “confounder” (an additional unobservable 
binary variable) and, more specifically, the probabilities of the effect of such variable on our data 
using it as an additional covariate in the matching regression29. 
The approach requires the transformation of our outcome variable in a dichotomous variable. 
Given that our two sharper results are on the share of trustors giving all (team or we-thinking 
trustors) and on the trustors making polarized choices, we decide to perform our sensitivity analysis 
on the polarized dummy variable. The baseline effect of the bridge dummy on polarized choices is  
0.175 and is highly significant (WSE: 0.022, t-stat 8.01). 
Our findings document that in all the performed simulations the bias is small and the simulated 
Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) remains positive and significant (Table VIII). The 
ATT remains strongly significant for any simulated confounder even under the extreme assumption 
that the probability of coming from a highly educated family is 50 percent higher for bridge players 
following polar strategies than for those not following them (maximum simulated outcome effect for 
the treated). Our main findings remain robust even when we remove the assumption that the 
confounder does not modify odds for poker players. Under the most unfavourable scenario we 
assume that the probabilty of coming from a highly educated family is 30 percent higher for poker 
players following polar strategies than for those not following polar strategies (maximum simulated 
outcome effect for the control).  The robustness of our results is also confirmed when there is a 30 
probability point difference between being bridge players and being poker players when coming 
                                                          
28 See also Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Imbens (2004) and Blatmann and Annan (2010).  
29 For further details on the sensitivity analysis see Appendix B. 
17 
 
from a highly educated family (p1.-p0.) (maximum simulated effect of the confounder on selection 
into treatment).  
The probability differences assumed for our killer confounders are by far larger if compared with 
the same conditional probabilities for observables (male gender, age above median, dummy for 
early respondents) which therefore produce even smaller biases (Table VIII, first three rows)30. This 
gives us additional confidence on the robustness of our findings to reasonable deviations from CIA.   
 
4. The incentivzed experiment 
We wonder whether results from the online simulated experiment are reliable and correspond to 
what would have happened in an experiment with monetary payoffs. To this purpose we build an 
additional treatment with monetary payoffs where both trustors and trustees are endowed with 10 
euros. The goal of our additional experiment with monetary payoffs is twofold: i) testing whether 
results on our null hypotheses of no difference between bridge and poker players (rejected in the 
simulated experiment)  are confirmed; ii) testing whether behavior in the online simulated 
experiment is a good predictor of behavior in the experiment with monetary payoffs. 
To implement the incentivized experiment we plan two different sessions for bridge and poker 
players adopting the same protocol as in the non incentivized experiment (with the exception of the 
monetary payoff and a proportionally reduced endowment). We introduce monetary payoffs 
explicitly informing the respondent that at the end of the session she would collect one of the 
realized payoffs randomly chosen. The questionnaire is administered after the experiment in order 
to avoid framing effects and coincides with that of the non incentivized experiment (with questions 
in the same order) with the exception of additional final questions on years of bridge and poker 
experience.  
                                                          
30 Under this assumption the largest difference in terms of maximum simulated outcome for the treated or for 
the control group (d1 or d0) is slightly less than .10, while for our killer confounders we consider a much 
wider difference (up to 0.6 percent). 
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We run the experiment on 150 experimental units for each card (poker and bridge) game group 
and within each group we split the sample into 75 trustor and 75 trustee participants.  
Expert bridge players are selected during the Italian national championship in March 2013 at 
Salsomaggiore Terme (Parma). The experiment session was organized in the hall of the building in 
a setting in which respondents had the possibility to sit down without looking at each other answers. 
The session took place during the registration procedures, before the beginning of the matches; it 
started at 9 a.m. in the morning and lasted until 2 p.m.. People were proposed to participate to the 
experiment, provided with experiment instructions and, after they played, answered the 
questionnaire. The overall amount of liquidated payoffs was € 1,531 and on average any participant 
earned €10.21. 
There is no official national (or regional) poker competition in Italy. The closest poker events to 
an official championship are tournaments organized by the largest private clubs in which the best 
players usually participate. Private tournaments follow the standard rules of the game, with real 
monetary stakes and a participation fee. Given the private nature of the tournament, the entry fee 
and the monetary stakes, the probability that an occasional player would participate to our 
experiment was extremely low. The poker players’ experiment was run in two distinct sessions 
which were organized in two of the largest poker rooms in Rome31: the “Mirage” on April, 20th 
2013 and the “Cotton Club” on July, 5th 2013. The experiment took place outside the playing room 
in the hall of the two clubs and started at 10 p.m. before the beginning of the tournament and lasted 
until 1 a.m.. People have been proposed to participate the experiment during the registration 
procedure32. At the end of the sessions all the payoff were liquidated for an overall amount of € 
1,277; on average every participant earned € 8.18. 
 
                                                          
31 Rome, together with Milan are the two largest and most important cities in which poker is played in Italy. 
Hence players use to go there from all over the country to compete with the best Italian players.  
32 As in the bridge tournaments the registration in private poker rounds is when the entry fees are paid and 
(unlike bridge) the monetary stakes (fiches) are bought. 
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4.1 The monetary payoff experiment (MPE) sample  
 
Characteristics of the MPE sample are quite similar to those of the OSE sample. As in the OSE 
sample bridge players are older (57.6 against 41.3) and more gender balanced than poker players 
(53.3 percent male players against 87.3 percent) (Tables IX-X).  Average years of bridge experience 
are 25.2 for bridge players, while those of poker experience are 11.6 for poker players. Around 7 
percent of bridge players also play poker and their average poker experience is around 26.29 years. 
On the contrary only 8.67 percent of poker players play also bridge and their average bridge 
experience is 6.15 years. The impact of game “fuzziness” (that is, the fact that the bridge and poker 
player identities are not mutually exclusive) and years of game experience on our findings will be 
dealt with in our econometric analysis. 
 
4.2 Players’ behaviour and hypothesis testing in the MPE 
Even though the number of observations in the MPE sample is far smaller we observe results 
which are strikingly similar to those of the OSE sample (Figure IB). That is, we find a significant 
difference in terms of trustor giving polar attitudes as a sum of the share of zero and maximum 
contributors (those following self-regarding rationality with self-regarding rationality being 
common knowledge or, at the opposite, team rationality with team rationality being common 
knowledge) (Table XII). More specifically we find that 34.6 percent of bridge players (against 26.6 
percent poker players) follow team rationality. This 8 percent difference is strikingly similar to the 
11 percent difference found in the OSE experiment where shares of team players in the two 
subgroups  are as well not so distant in absolute value from those of the MPE (31 and 20 percent 
respectively). Bridge players also lead in terms of share of zero contributors in the MP experiment 
as it was in the OS experiment  (22.7 against 12 percent). Note here that the distance was slightly 
smaller in the OS experiment (6 against 10 points), with the use of real money reducing the total 
share of zero contributors by more than 10 percent in both bridge and poker subsamples. The far 
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lower number of observations we have in the MP experiment makes the difference in zero and 
maximum contributors not statistically significant in parametric and non parametric testing. 
However the difference in terms of polar attitudes (sum of zero and maximum contributors) is much 
more remarkable (57.3 against 38.7) and statistically significant (non parametric test z-stat 5.24, p-
value 0.02 and parametric test t-stat -2.31, p-value 0.02). 
 
4.3 Econometric findings in the MPE 
As in the OS experiment, also in the MP experiment poker players are younger and males in higher 
proportion reflecting the respective differences of populations in the two games. A further test on 
the significance of the behavioural differences between bridge and poker players will be provided 
by econometric analysis controlling for the influence of such factors and, beyond them, for players’ 
“fuzziness” and game experience.  
We start our econometric analysis with the  following specification 
i
i
ititi XDBridgeY   10  
where the dependent variable Yi  is, in three different probit specifications, a 0/1 dummy taking 
value one if trustors i) send the maximum contribution; ii) send zero and iii) play polar (either 
choice i) or ii)). In a fourth final ordered probit specification the dependent variable is a qualitative 
discrete variable measuring the amount sent by the trustor. 
The X vector of controls in the specification includes a Male dummy, Age class dummies calculated 
as in the non incentivized experiment, Dictator (a variable measuring the amount sent by the player 
in the dictator game) and Riskav (our experimental measure of risk aversion). Province fixed effects 
are controlled for and standard errors are clustered at province level.  
In a first simpler specification we just add to this set of regressors the bridge player dummy 
(Dbridge) taking value one if the participant to the experiment is a bridge player. Empirical findings 
document that being a bridge player raises significantly the probability of choosing a polar strategy 
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as a trustor (Table XII, column 1). In terms of magnitude the result is stronger than what found 
descriptively. Being a bridge player also raises significantly the probability of choosing a team 
strategy (on which male gender and the amount sent in the dictator game both have positive and 
significant effects) (Table XII, column 3).33 The bridge dummy is also positive and significant  in 
the final ordered probit estimate in which the dependent variable is trustor giving (Table XII, 
column 4). Here as well male gender and dictator giving also impact positively. As already 
mentioned information collected in the MPE allows us to control (differently from what happened 
in the OSE) for “game fuzziness”. We therefore estimate a second specification in which we add a 
dummy for bridge players who also play poker (7.3 percent of the sample). The dummy is not 
significant while significance of our main finding is substantially unchanged with magnitudes 
becoming slightly larger and significance of the impact on trustor giving stronger (Table XII, 
columns 5-8). In our final specification we finally fully account for game fuzziness and game 
experience problems by replacing our dummies with two variables measuring years of bridge 
experience and years of poker experience respectively. With these new estimates we find that one 
year of bridge experience raises significantly by around 3.6 percent the probability of becoming a 
polar player and by around 2.2 percent the probability of becoming a team player (Table XII, 
columns 9-12). 
The significant relationship between bridge experience and polar strategies seems to indicate that 
the nexus we observe cannot be solely explained by a causality link going from preferences to game 
selection.In a final robustness check on our main findings we find that our main results are 
unchanged when we modify our benchmark specifications from Table XII by i) introducing 
regional dummies; ii) replacing age classes with a continuous age dummy without regional 
                                                          
33 Gender and age effects contribute to explain the different magnitude of the impact of the bridge dummy in 
parametric (non parametric) testing and in econometric estimates: once we control for the fact that young and 
male trustors are more likely to be maximum contributors the impact of bridge play (where males are 
significantly less and players are older) on the same dependent variable is stronger. We further check 
whether our magnitudes are affected by multicollinearity by calculating the VIF factor (Marquardt, 1970) of 
the estimate and find that this is not the case with VIF being always below 5. 
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dummies; iii) with regional dummies iv) replacing regional and provincial dummies with the social 
and human capital variables used in Tables V-VII, column 7.34   
We repeat the sensitivity analysis on the polar dummy using exactly the same simulation criteria 
followed in section 3.4. Again the effect of the polar dummy remains strongly significant as 
documented by the ratio between the ATE and the WSE (ie. 0.90 and 0.025 respectively when the 
confounder is calibrated based on the male dummy correlation) which is far larger than the 99 
percent significant threshold in all simulations (Table XIII). As in the OSE the bias simulated with 
killer confounders is much larger than that calibrated on observables and the main finding is robust 
also  under the more extreme perturbations considered in the simulation exercise. Significance is 
confirmed in all the sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.Conclusions 
Our research provides new evidence on the nexus between game experience and preferences. We 
document with a first online simulated experiment (OSE) and with a second experiment with 
monetary payoffs (MPE) that bridge players choose significantly more polar (and team) strategies 
than poker players when playing as trustors in trust games. Our findings are significant when 
controlling for “game fuzziness” (a few bridge players also play poker and viceversa) and years of 
game experience in the MPE. Results are reinforced when finding in the MPE that any additional 
year of bridge experience significantly raises the probability of choosing team strategies. A related 
important finding of our research is that results from the OSE predict reasonably well results from 
the MPE in terms of our main finding providing interesting evidence on the usually questioned 
issue (see Rubinstein, 2007 among others) of the unbiasedness/biasedness of non incentivized 
experiments.  
Our findings may partially shed light on the argument set forth by Akerlof and Shiller (2010) (an 
argument which inspired our research) wondering whether the switch from playing bridge to poker 
                                                          
34 Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 
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in the US may be related to a reduction of social skills and to the shift in financial agents’ practices 
which lie at the root of recent financial crises and scandals. Paper results are mixed in this respect. 
We find confirmation that bridge practice is (and years of bridge experience are) significantly 
associated to more cooperative behavior. However we also find that bridge play is significantly 
associated to purely self-regarding behavior (even though not significantly so in the econometrics of 
the incentivized experiment). The combination of these two findings is that bridge players choose 
markedly more polar strategies, our stronger result which encompasses the previous two. The 
reason why bridge players are more “aut-aut” players (that is, they stick to an extreme cooperative 
or purely self-regarding behavior) calls for future research and discussion. 
 
 
Appendix A: – The simulated experiment and the questionnaire 
The following questionnaire was proposed to bridge players over the period July 15th –September 
30, 2012 via the official web site of the Italian Bridge Federation (FIGB), which counts 24,900 
affiliates, all identified by a code number, necessary to play official competitions at club, national 
and international level. Such a code is also necessary to play in the bridge tournaments on line 
organized daily by the American Contract Bridge League. The total number of respondents was 
843. 
The questionnaire was proposed to poker players from July 9th to July 31st 2012 by SNAI via a 
secure system developed for them by the specialized firm  Problem Free Limited. 
Registered poker players, all identified by their social security number, once logged in the secure 









3. Choose which of the “head or tail” lotteries shown below you prefer to participate 
[indicating the number in square brackets]  
For each lottery we indicate in round brackets the probability of the above indicated win. 
This is an “head or tail” lottery where each of the two outcomes has a 50 percent probability 
of occurrence. (i.e. lottery [3] indicates that, by choosing this lottery, you have  a 50 percent 





4.  Assume you are given an amount of 100 euros and you can choose how much of this 
amount (between 0 and 100) you can give to an anonymous player. The amount sent will be 
multiplied by 3 (ie. if you send 10 it will become 30, if you send 100 it will become 300) 
and given to the anonymous player. At this point the anonymous player will decide how 
much to send back to you. He also will not know your identity. After this choice the game 
ends. 
How much would you give? Please choose one among the following: 
0 – 10 – 20 – 30 – 40 – 50 – 60 – 70 – 80 – 90 – 100 
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5. Assume you are given an amount of 100 euros and you can choose how much of this 
amount (between 0 and 100) you can give to an anonymous player.  After this choice the 
game ends.  
How much would you give? Please choose one among the following: 
0 – 10 – 20 – 30 – 40 – 50 – 60 – 70 – 80 – 90 – 100 
 
Appendix B: –  Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis allows us to assess to what extent our baseline ATT (see section 3.4) is 
robust to the exclusion of a potential confounder that might have different characteristics.  
The distribution of the confounder U is then described on the basis of four choice-parameters:   
pij =Pr(U = 1|T = i, Y = j) = Pr(U = 1|T = i, Y = j) 
with i, j = {0, 1}, where Y is the outcome (that is, the binary  transformation of the outcome for 
continuous outcomes, in our case the probability of team or polarized rationality) and T is the 
binary treatment (T=1 equals being a bridge player). 
In this way we may model each simulation parameter pij as representing the probability that U=1 if 
T=i    and Y=j.  
We conveniently conceive our potential confounder as a trait that makes individuals more likely to 
become bridge players (T=1) and, at the same time, more likely to make polarized choices in the 
trust game (Y=1). An example of it may be, say, family education which may increase both the 
probability of selection into treatment (becoming bridge player) and outcome (behaving as a 
polarized player, that is, choosing the maximum or the minimum). If we define our outcome 
variable as POLARIZED,  a reasonable way to model the distribution of the confounder is by 
setting:  
i) p11 > p10, so that Pr(U = 1| Bridge = 1|Polarized = 1) > Pr(U = 1| Bridge = 1|Polarized = 0) – 
implying that the probability of coming from a highly educated family is higher for bridge 
players who follow polarized choices than for bridge players who do not follow polarized 
choices; 
ii)  p01 = p00 , so that Pr(U = 1| Bridge = 0 |Polarized = 1) = Pr(U = 1| Bridge = 0|Polarized = 0)  - 
implying that the probability of coming from a highly educated family is the same for poker 




iii) p1.>p0. so that Pr(U = 1|Bridge = 1) > Pr(U = 1|Bridge = 0), implying that the probability of 
coming from a highly educated family is higher for bridge than for poker players. In other words, 
the confounder has a positive effect on treatment assignment.  
Following Ichino et al. (2008), we define d1 = p11 − p10, d0 = p01 − p00 and s = p1. − p0. in order to 
characterize the sign of the bias when estimating the baseline ATT (i.e. computed when U is not in 
the matching set). In our framework we look at cases in which d1 > 0 and d0 = 0 (positive effect of U 
on treated outcome and no effect of U on the untreated outcome) and s > 0 (positive effect of U on 
selection). In this way it is possible to identify the levels of d1 and s producing an estimated ATT 
substantially different from the baseline ATT and discuss to what extent the existence of a “killer” 
confounder with these characteristics is plausible. 
Results are reported in Table VIII for the online simulated experiment and in Table XII for the 
experiment with monetary payoffs  and include simulations where the maximum d1 is 0.6, while the 
maximum d0 is 0.3.  
All tables report values for s, the new ATT, the percent bias (calculated as the difference between 
the baseline ATT  and the simulated ATT scaled on the original ATT), the within estimated 




Male Dummy taking value one if the respondent is male 
Trustor transfer Amount sent by the trustor in the simulated trust game 
Dictator giving Amount sent by the sender in the simulated dictator game 
Risk aversion Lottery chosen in the risk aversion test based on the mean preserving 
spread principle (see Appendix A). The six lotteries have the same mean 
and are ranked on the basis of  ascending order of variance (ie. 0=lowest 
risk aversion,..,5= highest risk aversion) 






Share of inhabitants above 15 years old with more than intermediate 
school degree at province level 
Donations Total amount of officially registered donations in the province 
(thousands of euros) 




TABLE II. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – SIMULATED EXPERIMENT 
 
Variables   N. of obs. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. 
Male 
 
2250 0.861 0.346 0 1 
Age 
 
2249 46.319 14.129 18 100 
Risk aversion 2250 4.711 1.714 1 6 
Trustor giving 2250 43.462 38.113 0 100 
Early response 2250 0.537 0.499 0 1 
Above intermediate education 2232 44.742 6.604 35.206 57.17 
Donations 
 
2232 16.995 5.871 6.8 31.9 
Social cooperatives 
 
2232 21.147 21.285 0 65 
 
Variable legend: see Table I 
 
TABLE III. 








Non parametric  test* 
H0: (Poker) = (Bridge) 
(P-value) 
Parametric test T- test 
H0: (Poker) = (Bridge) 
(P-value) 










*For continuous variables (Age) we test - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences by 
using the Mann-Whitney test. For dichotomous variables (Male) we use the Chi square test to analyse the differences in 
proportions 
 








Non parametric  
test* 




H0: (1) = (2) 
(P-value) 
 
  Trustor giving    
 




Maximum contributors (%) (a) 
  
























*For (approximated) to continuous variables such as trustor giving we test - through nonparametric statistics – between 
subject differences by using the Mann-Whitney test. For dichotomous variables (all the other variables) we use the Chi 




TRUSTOR GIVING (ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATE) – SIMULATED EXPERIMENT* 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
                
Male 0.0162 0.139*** 0.0230 0.0287 0.139*** 0.136** 0.144*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0528) (0.0536) (0.0601) (0.0528) (0.0573) (0.0526) 
30-40 age class 0.167* 0.149 0.168* 0.178* 0.141 0.141 0.146 
 (0.0872) (0.0942) (0.0889) (0.0931) (0.0961) (0.101) (0.0962) 
40-50 age class 0.259*** 0.208*** 0.262*** 0.279*** 0.202*** 0.215*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0671) (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0674) (0.0654) (0.0684) (0.0643) 
50-60 age class 0.221*** 0.0894 0.225*** 0.231*** 0.0869 0.0801 0.0809 
 (0.0718) (0.0778) (0.0714) (0.0735) (0.0776) (0.0824) (0.0782) 
60-70 age class 0.181* 0.0533 0.179* 0.174* 0.0500 0.0389 0.0417 
 (0.0926) (0.0903) (0.0938) (0.0949) (0.0921) (0.0933) (0.0902) 
70-80 age class -0.0421 -0.274* -0.0429 -0.0523 -0.264* -0.279* -0.277* 
 (0.135) (0.149) (0.135) (0.136) (0.149) (0.150) (0.151) 
Above 80 age class 0.0533 -0.103 0.0580 -0.0174 -0.102 -0.135 -0.129 
 (0.400) (0.275) (0.401) (0.441) (0.264) (0.296) (0.266) 
Bridge 0.108** 0.265*** 0.122** 0.130** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0512) (0.0567) (0.0583) (0.0523) (0.0550) (0.0511) 
Early response   -0.0419 -0.0323 0.0180 0.0234 0.0197 
   (0.0407) (0.0431) (0.0453) (0.0480) (0.0450) 
Risk aversion     -0.0147 -0.0173 -0.0152 
     (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0143) 
Dictator giving     0.0185*** 0.0189*** 0.0184*** 
     (0.000956) (0.00106) (0.000944) 
Above Intermediate Education       0.00160 
       (0.00174) 
Donations       0.00423 
       (0.00424) 
Social cooperatives       0.00223** 
       (0.000938) 
Province dummies NO NO NO YES NO YES NO 
        
Region dummies NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
        
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,231 
        





THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MAXIMUM TRUSTOR GIVING CHOICE 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
                
Male 0.0589*** 0.0630*** 0.0691*** 0.0877*** 0.0889*** 0.0935*** 0.0894*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0204) (0.0215) (0.0189) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0180) 
30-40 age class 0.104** 0.0995** 0.111** 0.0903** 0.0842** 0.0944** 0.0899** 
 (0.0406) (0.0403) (0.0448) (0.0434) (0.0425) (0.0476) (0.0443) 
40-50 age class 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.131*** 0.0912*** 0.0838** 0.103*** 0.0900*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0343) (0.0382) (0.0346) (0.0335) (0.0374) (0.0345) 
50-60 age class 0.127*** 0.119*** 0.129*** 0.0757** 0.0678* 0.0724* 0.0731* 
 (0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0378) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0401) (0.0377) 
60-70 age class 0.102** 0.0894** 0.0949** 0.0523 0.0406 0.0428 0.0460 
 (0.0408) (0.0395) (0.0426) (0.0401) (0.0391) (0.0418) (0.0396) 
70-80 age class 0.0399 0.0311 0.0206 -0.0270 -0.0299 -0.0400 -0.0304 
 (0.0478) (0.0459) (0.0480) (0.0519) (0.0500) (0.0505) (0.0512) 
Above 80 age class 0.0471 0.0456 -0.0313 -0.0128 -0.0171 -0.0631 -0.0210 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.103) (0.0829) (0.0802) (0.0679) (0.0781) 
Bridge 0.110*** 0.117*** 0.124*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0235) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.0218) (0.0195) 
Early response  -0.0277 -0.0285  -0.0127 -0.0147 -0.0128 
  (0.0183) (0.0199)  (0.0187) (0.0204) (0.0189) 
Risk aversion    -0.000242 3.65e-05 -0.00166 -0.000104 
    (0.00538) (0.00509) (0.00527) (0.00538) 
Dictator giving    0.00404*** 0.00399*** 0.00419*** 0.00403*** 
    (0.000281) (0.000293) (0.000329) (0.000288) 
Above Intermediate Education       0.00189** 
       (0.000891) 
Donations       0.00274 
       (0.00194) 
Social cooperatives       0.00111** 
       (0.000432) 
Province dummies NO NO NO YES NO YES NO 
        
Region dummies NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
        
Constant -1.312 -6.966 -7.026 -1.701 -7.459 -7.492 -2.187 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.29) 
        
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,166 2,238 2,238 2,166 2,231 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.0218 0.0307 0.0541 0.1108 0.1192 0.1455 0.1133 
Log pseudolikelihood -1209.70 -1198.71 -1150.57 -1099.57 -1089.27 -1039.33 -1094.81 
Notes: Dependent variable is 1 if transfer=100 or zero otherwise . 
Variable legend: see Table I. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered  at province level . *** p<0.01, ** 






THE DETERMINANTS OF THE TRUSTOR POLARIZED CHOICES – SIMULATED EXPERIMENT 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
                
Male 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.148*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0275) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0282) (0.0275) 
30-40 age class 0.0701* 0.0639* 0.0678* 0.0706* 0.0647* 0.0685* 0.0674* 
 (0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0412) (0.0388) (0.0391) (0.0416) (0.0387) 
40-50 age class 0.0561* 0.0476 0.0554 0.0556* 0.0473 0.0548 0.0544* 
 (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0346) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0351) (0.0331) 
50-60 age class 0.0742** 0.0610* 0.0655* 0.0762** 0.0631* 0.0673* 0.0729** 
 (0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0374) (0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0372) (0.0349) 
60-70 age class 0.0524 0.0409 0.0446 0.0533 0.0418 0.0452 0.0461 
 (0.0393) (0.0392) (0.0419) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0427) (0.0403) 
70-80 age class 0.0548 0.0472 0.0357 0.0572 0.0492 0.0370 0.0518 
 (0.0701) (0.0697) (0.0735) (0.0714) (0.0712) (0.0749) (0.0718) 
Above 80 age class 0.0364 0.0264 -0.0499 0.0335 0.0234 -0.0549 0.0282 
 (0.156) (0.162) (0.165) (0.153) (0.159) (0.162) (0.158) 
Bridge 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0269) (0.0293) (0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0294) (0.0268) 
Early response  -0.0191 -0.0209  -0.0207 -0.0222 -0.0235 
  (0.0234) (0.0245)  (0.0231) (0.0241) (0.0230) 
Risk aversion    0.00582 0.00593 0.00555 0.00588 
    (0.00550) (0.00536) (0.00558) (0.00552) 
Dictator giving    -0.000290 -0.000290 -0.000231 -0.000303 
    (0.000377) (0.000370) (0.000390) (0.000372) 
Above Intermediate 
Education 
      0.000954 
       (0.00104) 
Donations       0.00284 
       (0.00208) 
Social cooperatives       0.000639 
       (0.000531) 
Province dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Region dummies NO YES NO NO YES NO NO 
        
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,214 2,238 2,238 2,214 2,231 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.0218 0.0307  0.0541  0.1108  0.1192   0.1455 0.1133  
Log pseudolikelihood -1209.70 -1198.71 -1150.57 -1099.57 -1089.27 -1039.33 -1094.81 
Notes: Dependent variable is 1 if transfer=100 or zero otherwise . 
Variable legend: see Table I. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered  at province level . *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Age class: the omitted benchmark is the age class below 30.  
TABLE VIII. 
SENSITIVITY OF THE POLARIZED EFFECT TO DEPARTURES FROM THE CIA ASSUMPTION – SIMULATED EXPERIMENT  






Confounders calibrated on observables 
Male 0.79 0.75 0.95 0.93 0.77 0.94 -0.17 0.04 0.02 -0.0857 0.19 0.226 1.505 0.025 
Ageabmedian 0.82 0.82 0.41 0.32 0.82 0.36 0.46 0 0.09 0.2514 0.131 8.22 1.484 0.028 
Early response 0.7 0.66 0.5 0.56 0.68 0.53 0.15 0.04 -0.06 -0.0514 0.184 1.906 0.793 0.022 
Killer confounders 
Killer confounders 
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.56 0.33 0.23 0.1 0.3 0.434 0.099 2.589 4.016 0.024 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.62 0.33 0.29 0.2 0.3 0.549 0.079 3.344 4.023 0.025 
0.8 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.68 0.33 0.35 0.3 0.3 0.669 0.058 4.408 4.026 0.026 
0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.52 0.33 0.19 0.2 0.3 0.366 0.111 2.221 4.056 0.024 
0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.58 0.33 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.480 0.091 2.86 4.031 0.025 
0.8 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.64 0.33 0.31 0.4 0.3 0.600 0.07 3.692 4.045 0.026 
0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.48 0.33 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.291 0.124 1.902 4.026 0.023 
0.7 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.54 0.33 0.21 0.4 0.3 0.406 0.104 2.426 4.043 0.024 
0.8 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.61 0.33 0.28 0.5 0.3 0.057 0.165 3.133 4.054 0.025 
0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.44 0.33 0.11 0.4 0.3 0.217 0.137 1.625 4.044 0.023 
0.7 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.51 0.33 0.18 0.5 0.3 0.331 0.117 2.077 4.014 0.023 
0.8 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.57 0.33 0.24 0.6 0.3 0.446 0.097 2.653 4.046 0.024 
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.50 0.06 0.1 0.0 0.000 0.175 1.284 1.000 0.022 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.62 0.50 0.12 0.2 0.0 0.000 0.175 1.656 1.004 0.022 
0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.68 0.50 0.18 0.3 0.0 0.000 0.175 2.172 1.012 0.023 
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.56 0.44 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.063 0.164 1.612 1.503 0.022 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.62 0.44 0.18 0.2 0.1 0.097 0.158 2.079 1.508 0.023 
0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.68 0.44 0.24 0.3 0.1 0.137 0.151 2.733 1.516 0.023 
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.56 0.39 0.17 0.1 0.2 0.206 0.139 2.035 2.345 0.023 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.62 0.39 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.274 0.127 2.618 2.340 0.024 
0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.68 0.39 0.29 0.3 0.2 0.343 0.115 3.424 2.333 0.024 
              
Note: Ageabmedian: dummy taking value 1 if age of the respondent is above sample median. Bias % = (ATE baseline-ATE)/ATE baseline - NB: Baseline ATE (no confounders) = 0.175 
(WSE:.022, t-stat 8.01).  d1 = p11 − p10 (outcome effect of U for the treated);  d0 = p01 − p00 (outcome effect of U for the controls); s = p1 − p0  (effect of U on the selection into treatment 
 Selection effect (odds) =                          ; Outcome effect (odds) =                                        ; T and W being the treatment indicator and the observable set of covariates 
respectively.  WSE = “within-imputation standard errors”. For further details see Ichino et al., (2008).
TABLE IX. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (OVERALL SAMPLE) - INCENTIVIZED EXPERIMENT 
Variable   Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Min Max 






















300 0.703 0.458 
 
0 1 





Poker experience (years) 
 










299 3.712 2.947 
 
0 10 







289 10.329 4.274 
 
1 17 
        Experience in poker 
for a bridge player (years) 
 
21 26.285 14.926 
 
3 50 
Experience in bridge 
for a poker player (years)   















Non parametric  
test* 
Parametric test T- 
test 
(1) (2) H0: (Poker) = (Bridge) H0: (Poker) = (Bridge) 
(Means) (Means) (P-value) (P-value) 
Male (%) 53.30 87.33 
41.55 6.921 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Age 57.63 41.33 
-10.229 -12.277 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Game experience 25.21 11.56 
-9.482 -10.434 
(0.000) (0.000) 















Non parametric  
test* 
Parametric test T- 
test 
(1) -(2) H0: (1) = (2) H0: (1) = (2) 
(Means) (Means) (P-value) (P-value) 
        
























*For (approximated) to continuous variables such as Risk aversion, we test - through nonparametric statistics – between subject differences by using the Mann-Whitney test. For 
dichotomous variables (all the other variables) we use the Chi square test to analyse the differences in proportions. 
TABLE XII. ECONOMETRIC FINDINGS – INCENTIVIZED EXPERIMENTS 
                          
VARIABLES POLAR ZERO C. TEAM TRUST POLAR ZERO C. TEAM TRUST POLAR ZERO C. TEAM TRUST 
Male 0.153 -0.0384 0.179** 0.497* 0.149 -0.0340 0.173** 0.478* 0.0158 -0.0530 0.0704 0.377 
 (0.1016) (0.0434) (0.0624) (0.2141) (0.1001) (0.0401) (0.0658) (0.2266) (0.0885) (0.0420) (0.0824) (0.2184) 
Below 30 age class 0.288* -0.0456 0.186* -0.106 0.294* -0.0540 0.181* -0.0602 0.522*** -0.0314 0.399* -0.00773 
 (0.1223) (0.0595) (0.0823) (0.2462) (0.1232) (0.0561) (0.0855) (0.2524) (0.0961) (0.1043) (0.1752) (0.3748) 
30-40 age class 0.134 -0.0979*** 0.398*** 0.946** 0.143 -0.102*** 0.400*** 1.004*** 0.413** -0.0942** 0.593*** 1.067*** 
 (0.1426) (0.0244) (0.0918) (0.2965) (0.1448) (0.0310) (0.0922) (0.2819) (0.1356) (0.0321) (0.1036) (0.2981) 
40-50 age class -0.0777 -0.279* 0.285*** 0.942*** -0.0728 -0.297* 0.277*** 0.984*** 0.173 -0.262 0.502*** 1.133*** 
 (0.1227) (0.1093) (0.0708) (0.2066) (0.1235) (0.1352) (0.0732) (0.1982) (0.1335) (0.1342) (0.0857) (0.2149) 
50-60 age class 0.0160 -0.121 0.119 0.313 0.0230 -0.134 0.120 0.368 0.204 -0.116 0.272* 0.471 
 (0.1300) (0.0723) (0.0985) (0.3325) (0.1298) (0.0907) (0.0996) (0.3395) (0.1423) (0.0843) (0.1159) (0.3388) 
60-70 age class -0.397** -0.0992*** -0.169 0.246 -0.397** -0.101*** -0.180 0.277 -0.456** -0.103*** -0.149 0.508 
 (0.1443) (0.0280) (0.1555) (0.4851) (0.1385) (0.0295) (0.1496) (0.5036) (0.1741) (0.0286) (0.1676) (0.4427) 
70-80 age class -0.445*** -0.0725*** 
 
0.0394 -0.447*** -0.0721*** 
 
0.0379 -0.500*** -0.0757*** 
 
0.0716 
 (0.0771) (0.0117) 
 
(0.3275) (0.0745) (0.0105) 
 
(0.3423) (0.0133) (0.0116) 
 
(0.3127) 
Dictator giving 0.00764 -0.0341*** 0.0586*** 0.249*** 0.00792 -0.0340*** 0.0593*** 0.250*** 0.00915 -0.0335*** 0.0621*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0455) (0.0103) (0.0092) (0.0080) (0.0440) (0.0095) (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0409) 
Bridge 0.563*** 0.0170 0.555*** 0.884*** 0.573*** 0.00779 0.578*** 0.934*** 
    
 (0.1125) (0.0333) (0.0990) (0.2084) (0.1242) (0.0419) (0.0907) (0.1862) 
    
Risk aversion -0.0416** -0.00796 -0.0211* -0.0111 -0.0415** -0.00744 -0.0214* -0.0116 -0.0456** -0.00845 -0.0265** -0.0131 
 (0.0134) (0.0050) (0.0090) (0.0281) (0.0132) (0.0052) (0.0088) (0.0285) (0.0148) (0.0053) (0.0097) (0.0296) 
Province dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region dummy NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Both games played 
    
-0.0797 0.0370 -0.139*** -0.333 
    
 
    
(0.1622) (0.1544) (0.0398) (0.4885) 
    
Bridge experience 
        
0.0359*** 0.00169 0.0222*** 0.0190 
 
        
(0.0065) (0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0121) 
Poker experience 
        
0.00907 0.00118 0.00275 0.00130 
 
        
(0.0050) (0.0009) (0.0041) (0.0061) 
Observations 112 108 104 148 112 108 104 148 112 108 104 148 




SENSITIVITY OF THE POLARIZED EFFECT TO DEPARTURES FROM THE CIA ASSUMPTION ECONOMETRIC FINDINGS- INCENTIVIZED EXPERIMENTS 




Effect (Odds) WSE 
Confounders calibrated on observables 
Male 0.79 0.75 0.95 0.93 0.77 0.94 -0.17 0.04 0.02 -6.95 0.200 0.241 1.444 0.098 
Ageabmedian 0.82 0.82 0.41 0.32 0.82 0.35 0.47 0.00 0.09 22.46 0.145 9.258 1.659 0.106 





0.60 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.56 0.32 0.24 0.10 0.30 42.78 0.107 2.932 4.81 0.60 
0.70 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.61 0.31 0.3 0.20 0.30 51.34 0.091 3.666 4.755 0.70 
0.80 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.67 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.30 64.71 0.066 4.843 4.988 0.80 
0.60 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.51 0.32 0.19 0.20 0.30 35.29 0.121 2.449 5.010 0.60 
0.70 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.57 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.30 46.52 0.100 3.127 4.941 0.70 
0.80 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.63 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.30 56.68 0.081 3.966 4.967 0.80 
0.60 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.47 0.32 0.15 0.30 0.30 27.81 0.135 2.066 4.862 0.60 
0.70 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.53 0.32 0.21 0.40 0.30 38.50 0.115 2.568 4.947 0.70 
0.80 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.59 0.32 0.27 0.50 0.30 48.13 0.097 3.236 4.933 0.80 
0.60 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.11 0.40 0.30 20.32 0.149 1.741 4.967 0.60 
0.70 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.49 0.32 0.17 0.50 0.30 31.02 0.129 2.185 5.034 0.70 
0.80 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.32 0.22 0.60 0.30 41.18 0.110 2.735 5.036 0.80 
0.60 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.187 1.340 1.108 0.60 
0.70 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.61 0.50 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.53 0.186 1.704 1.131 0.70 
0.80 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.17 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.187 2.212 1.137 0.80 
0.60 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.56 0.44 0.12 0.10 0.10 6.42 0.175 1.703 1.711 0.60 
0.70 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.61 0.44 0.17 0.20 0.10 9.63 0.169 2.186 1.753 0.70 
0.80 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.67 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.10 12.83 0.163 2.795 1.731 0.80 
0.60 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.56 0.38 0.18 0.10 0.20 20.32 0.149 2.236 2.750 0.60 
0.70 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.61 0.38 0.23 0.20 0.20 26.74 0.137 2.859 2.706 0.70 
0.80 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.67 0.38 0.29 0.30 0.20 32.62 0.126 3.582 2.806 0.80 
              
Note: Ageabmedian: dummy taking value 1 if age of the respondent is above sample median. Bias % = (ATE baseline-ATE)/ATE baseline - NB: Baseline ATE (no confounders) = 0. 
(WSE:.057, t-stat 3.272).  d1 = p11 − p10 (outcome effect of U for the treated);  d0 = p01 − p00 (outcome effect of U for the controls); s = p1 − p0  (effect of U on the selection into treatment 
 Selection effect (odds) =                          ; Outcome effect (odds) =                                        ; T and W being the treatment indicator and the observable set of covariates respectively.  WSE 






TRUSTOR GIVING FOR BRIDGE AND POKER PLAYERS 


































Figure IA Simulated Experiment


































Figure IB. Monetary Payoff Experiment
Bridge players Poker players
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